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‘Targeting State and Political Leadership in Armed Conflicts’ 
 





In targeting decisions related to the political leadership or infrastructure associated 
with the political leadership of the state it is first necessary to establish who or what is 
the intended target of an attack. Establishing whether the attack is directed at the 
people using the objects, or at the objects themselves is vital as the ensuing legal 
analysis of the status of the target will be different in the context of the people and the 
objects. This paper shows that, contrary to numerous assertions, one should not 
assume that individuals vested with the Commander-in-Chief functions can be 
uniformly regarded as lawful targets either based on their status or on their conduct 
constituting direct participation in hostilities. It is further argued that there is a 
relationship between a nature and the scope of the activities of state bodies, which 
may not only give raise to their direct participation in hostilities but also impact a 
legal assessment of the objects which such individuals use or intend to use in the 





Whilst much research and debate in the law of armed conflict has, in recent years, 
concentrated on the issue of when and how people may be subject to lawful attack, far 
less consideration was given to the question of if, and if, is so, when objects 
associated with certain human activity can be regarded as lawful military objectives. 
It may partly be due to the fact that we have a well-established rule in the law of 
armed conflicts which stipulates that an occurrence of human activity described as  
‘military use’ is likely to render used so physical objects as legitimate targets in the 	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given circumstances.2 Quintessential in such an assessment is an identification of the 
qualifying ‘use’ and the required temporal scope of such a use. In regards to most 
objects such an assessment will be rather straight- forward.  
 
However, in relation to some objects such an assessment will prove to be far more 
challenging. These targets include places and infrastructure associated with the 
direction of the conduct of armed conflict including the control over armed forces by 
the civilian political leadership. The assessment of such objects raises some 
fundamental questions about the way in which they satisfy the criteria attached to the 
definition of military objectives and specifically its first element of ‘effective 
contribution to military action’ by ‘use’ or other criteria.  Such objects may satisfy the 
definition of military objectives if they are used by combatants or by other individuals 
for military purposes. In case of the latter, the ‘activity’- centered analysis, evaluation 
of activity undertaken in given locations and buildings will determine the object’s 
satisfaction of the first element of the definition. The question becomes then relevant 
as to what are the boundaries of activity of civilian political leadership, which can be 
classed as having military purposes. Similarly, when the objects are used by the 
combatants for activities related to the conduct of hostilities, such targets are likely to 
be legitimate. There is also an argument that a use of objects by combatants 
irrespective of the specific military purposes would equally and in all circumstances 
render them lawful targets.  The question arises, though, whether a similar association 
of buildings or places with a non-combatant politician on account of their war-
fighting powers or functions may be considered sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of the test. 
 
Recent conflicts provide a plentitude of the examples in which targets, namely those 
associated with leadership exercising command and control over armed forces and 
other functions or powers vital to the conduct of military operations have been 
attacked.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ‘In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.’ Art.52.2 API See further discussion of these events in AGNIESZKA JACHEC-
NEALE, THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
TARGETING PRACTICE, (1st ed. Routledge 2015).  
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Facilities associated with Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party in Iraq were 
frequently attacked both in 1991 and in 2003. In 1991 they included a variety of 
leadership-related national level facilities such as the Ministry of Justice, the Iraqi 
Central Bank and the Ministry of Industry, of Planning, of Information. In addition to 
these, in 2003 the Internal Security Agency, the Ba’ath Party headquarters, 
Presidential Secretariat, Presidential Bunker, Dora Farm, Baghdad Emergency Forces 
as well as offices and living quarters of Hussein’s guards were engaged. During te 
1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo Slobodan Milosevic’s residence and the Serbian 
Socialist Party headquarters were subjected to direct and indirect attacks.3 In April 
2013 United Nations (UN) forces have fired at the presidential palace, believed to be 
housing Cote D’Ivoire’s president Laurent Gbagbo.4  
 
Unprecedented interest in targeting leadership facilities could be, in part, explained by 
progressive developments in military doctrine in recent years. Enemy leadership and 
associated infrastructure has become regarded as one of the strategic and operational 
Centres of Gravity.5 This trend in military thinking has been transplanted into 
operational targeting with numerous targets being attacked during the past few 
conflicts, as mentioned above. Whilst the targeting and attacking of such objects 
progressively gain in number, the uncertainties regarding their qualification as 
military objectives remained.  
 
This paper will address some of the issues pertinent in the consideration of persons 
and objects used or associated with state and political leadership as lawful targets. 
The paper will begin by examining the status of state authorities on various levels of 
authority, both in their individual capacity and as a part of collective bodies, in a light 
of their position within the Government and the functions allocated to them. 
Following from there consideration will be given to the determination of  the status of 
the members of political parties from the perspective of the application of principle of 
distinction. This will complete first part of the text. The second part will focus on 
physical objects associated with the state and political party leaderships. Here it will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibidem. 
4 Ivory Coast: UN fire on Pro-Gbabgbo Camp , BBC, 21 April 2011  
5 JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1, see discussion in Chapters 7 and 9 
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be necessary to introduce the constituent requirements of the definition of military 
objectives first. This is due to the fact that while both persons and objects can be both 
deemed military objectives, the definition of military objective will only apply to 
objects such as infrastructure, buildings, places, equipment and so on.  In this part 
consideration will be given to such objects from the perspective of their relationship 
to figures of authority in a broader sense of affiliation and in more concrete aspect of 
actual use by these individuals. This part will explore intricate aspects of the 
relationship between the position or functions of the persons in leadership positions 
and the determination of lawfulness of the targets associated with the individuals.  
This will, however, only be possible after looking at the parameters of the lawfulness 
of targeting persons in positions of leadership both in the Governmental structures 
and in the highest ranks of political parties. 
  
2. Targeting leadership 
 
In predominantly democratic political systems the executive, judiciary and legislative 
organs tend to vested with various competencies of control over armed forces Civil 
control over armed forces is usually seen as an attribute of stable democracy, but it is 
certainly not confined to such a system. There is no single model of such a setup and 
the degrees of control vary too. The ultimate constitutional arrangements defining an 
adopted approach will depend on the political system of the individual state as well as 
its historical and cultural context.  
 
Civil control over armed forces can take the form of direct or indirect management, 
command and supervision by state organs. Direct control may involve distinctively 
‘military’ in character decisions or functions related to or affecting the prosecution of 
armed conflicts. Examples of such competencies may include the decision about 
deployment and re-deployment of armed forces into theater, decisions about 
belligerent reprisals and targeting decisions requiring the highest level of 
authorization.  Democratic control and political direction which are linked to the 
prosecution of hostilities during armed conflicts, can be undertaken by a President, 
Prime Minister, a whole Cabinet of Ministers or even whole Parliaments. Their 
position in the military-oriented political structure as well as how directly and 
effectively are they involved in making decisions about the prosecution of armed 
	  	   5	  
conflicts may define the degree to which they might be regarded as legitimate targets 
during armed conflicts. In other words, the position of the function holder as well as 
the scope of the associated function are two key factors subject to this consideration. 
 
In the determination of whether a leader can be seen as a lawful target rests on the 
application of the fundamental principle of distinction. In line with its precepts, 
distinction will always have to be made between military objectives and civilians or 
civilian objects.6 ‘Military objectives’ may include both human beings and physical 
objects recognized as lawful targets. In international armed conflicts, combatants and 
civilians directly participating in hostilities constitute two categories of persons who 
would be classed as military objectives. In other words the designation of these 
categories could be respectively status- and conduct-based. In non-international 
armed conflicts ‘combatancy’ does not arise but the members of either state’s armed 
forces or organized armed groups are too considered to be legitimate targets. In 
addition, a determination of the scope of the individual’s engagement in hostilities 
needs to be undertaken. The notion of ‘direct participation in hostilities’, inherently 
difficult to be interpreted and applied in the context of either type of armed conflicts, 
has received more attention and elaboration in recent years. In 2009, the ICRC has 
published the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, which hugely assisted in clarifying 
several aspects of this notion.7 While the Guidance does not contain any specific 
findings in respect to state and political party leaders, it may prove nevertheless useful 
in shedding light on application of the notion of direct participation also to various 
figures of authority, whose position or function involves a certain level of engagement 
in  the prosecution of armed conflict.  
 
The following sub- sections of this paper will examine such positions or functions 
starting with two positions which constitute a formal part of the operational military 
command chain. First position is that of Commander-in-Chief (CiC) and  the second 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6Principle of distinction finds its relevant expression in Articles 48,50-52 of Additional Protocol I to 
1949 Geneva Conventions.   
7  NILS MELZER, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (ICRC 
2009) 
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one is the position of Minister of Defence (MOD), in some states also referred to as 




The Commander-in Chief is a nominated civilian head of armed forces. The person in 
this position is usually vested with exercising supreme command powers. The 
prevalent practice is to assume that Heads of the States are also holders of CiC 
functions but this can be misleading. In Germany, the Head of the State is the 
President but the CiC holder is the Federal Minister of Defence, when in peacetime 
and the Federal Chancellor when in a state of war.8  
 
In some states, the  position of CiC is purely ceremonial or figurative and the actual 
command over the armed forces in undertaken by someone else. It is very important 
to make a distinction between de jure and de facto holders of the CiC position. The 
position of de jure holder of the command authority who delegates this authority or 
exercises it on the advice of some other organ will be, in practice, purely nominal. In 
this situation, the other executive organs, de facto CiC exercise the supreme command 
competences. In a parliamentary democracy this could be the Prime Minister and/or 
the Cabinet led by the Prime Minister. In a presidential system this will be the 
President and in a semi-presidential democracy it could be either the President or the 
Prime Minister. It may well be that de jure CiC may appoint the CiC nominated by 
the President or Prime Minister to discharge the actual supreme command functions. 
UK’s monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, for example, is the nominated CiC in the UK, 
Australia and Canada and is regarded as ‘Head of the Armed Forces’ and ‘ultimate 
authority’, to whom military personnel swear allegiance. However, a long-standing 
constitutional convention, under the exercise of the Royal Prerogative powers, has de 
facto bestowed on the Prime Minister, with a support of the Cabinet, an authority to 
make the key decisions on the use of the armed forces. 9 In Australia, the same powers 
are de jure delegated to the Governor General as the Queen’s representative, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 AGNIESZKA JACHEC-NEALE, THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND TARGETING PRACTICE  60 (1st ed. Routledge 2015).  
9 GAIL BARTLET& MICHAEL EVERETT, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 5, 9 (The House of 
Commons Library Briefing Paper  No. 03861 17 August 2017) 
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in practice, CiC functions are executed by the Cabinet chaired by the Prime Minister. 
This implies de facto collective exercise of CiC functions, which is not an unusual 
arrangement. Sweden has a similar conventional arrangement, in which CiC functions 
are not undertaken by the Head of the State, namely a non-executive monarch, but by 
the Cabinet lead by the Prime Minister but then delegated to the highest-ranking 
military professional.10    
 
In China, Article 93 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China conferred 
the authority to direct Armed Forces onto the Central Military Commission. 
Separately to that the President, as Head of State, has been traditionally granted 
powers to issue orders of general mobilization or to proclaim a state of war.11 Since 
1993 the standard practice has been that the same person holds both positions but only 
recently it seems that the President fully has taken over the role and the associated 
powers of CiC.12 This would indicate a shift to a similar setup to the one in the United 
States where  the CiC, the President, is the supreme commander in the operational 
chain of command whilst the Secretary of Defense is second in command. 13 
Noteworthy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff de jure assist both the President 
and the Secretary of Defense in  the exercise of the their command functions but it is 
unclear how much of these are, in practice, de facto executed by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
 
Scholarly sources in the Laws of Armed Conflicts (LOAC) field often indicate that 
CiCs are considered military objectives.14 One source even gives an example of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Sweden, The Instrument of Government (SFS nr: 1974:152), 
Article 5 in Chapter, Article 1 in Chapter 5 and Article 9 in Chapter  10; SWEDISH ARMED 
FORCES, STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITY, available here: 
http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/organisation/organisational-structure-and-responsibilities/  
11 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Full text after amendment on March 14, 2004), 
Articles 80 and 93, THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA,  available here: http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-
11/15/content_1372968.htm 
12 Ankit Panda, Xi Jinping Presides Over Massive PLA Parade as Commander-in-Chief, THE 
DIPLOMAT (July 31, 2017), https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/xi-jinping-presides-over-massive-pla-
parade-as-commander-in-chief/ ;  John Sudworth, China’s Xi Jinping takes commander in chief 
military title, BBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-36101140      
13 H.R.3622 - Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No: 
99-433, 10 USC 111 note. 
14  YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 107 (2d ed. Cambridge University Press 2010). 
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1993 killing of then Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa which is said to 
have been compliant with the principle of distinction given both de jure position and 
de facto exercise of CiC functions by the President.15 The question arises whether 
such an attack would have been lawful on account of the President’s legal status as a 
combatant due to  the CiC position being a part of the operational military chain of 
command.  For the CiC to be regarded as a combatant in international armed conflict, 
the CiC would have to be, at the very least, a member of the armed forces within the 
responsible command structure.16 In some sources members of armed forces are 
defined as those who are ‘actually serving’ in such forces.17 The ICRC Guidance 
suggests referring to the domestic law arrangements in regards to armed forces 
membership expressed via a ‘formal integration into permanent units distinguishable 
by uniforms, insignia and equipment’.18  The US Department of Defense recent 
LOAC Manual stipulates that whilst the CiC is not a member of the armed forces, it is 
still targetable if he or she is responsible for operational command.19 This is indicative 
of the US taking a second approach, in which the function rather than combatant 
status associated with the position of CiC is more relevant.20 This could be contrasted 
with clearly uniformed pictures of China’s President Xi Jingping wearing military 
uniform and insignia indicating that China’s CiC is likely to actually be considered a 
member of  the armed forces and thus a combatant in the event of international armed 
conflict.  
 
It has to be noted that if, as per the ICRC Guidance recommendation, it is up to each 
and individual state to define whether the CiC is a member of the armed forces then it 
may be the case that state practice should not be assumed to be uniform in this sphere. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 366 (1st ed. 
Oxford University Press 2012). 
16  Article 43 Additional Protocol I in relation to Art. 4A of 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION III; 
DINSTEIN,  SUPRA N 14, 33  
17 IBIDEM. 
18  NILS MELZER, THE INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INETRNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 25 
(ICRC 2009).[hereinafter THE GUIDANCE] 
19 U.S.DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 5.7.4 (2015, updated 2016) 
[hereinafter DOD MANUAL] 
20 US interprets notion of DPH broader than it is reflected in ICRC Guidance. US DOD LOAC Manual 
outlines in general terms that DPH includes acts that ‘effectively or substantially’ contribute to an 
adversary’s ability to conduct or sustain combat operations’. This way defined DPH will encompass a 
wide spectrum of CiC functions. DOD MANUAL  ¶ 5.7.4 and ¶ 5.8.3.1 
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Furthermore, it may be vitally important too for the state that wishes to launch an 
attack on the enemy’s individual to actually know what the adversary’s domestic 
regulation is in this context. As a combatant he or she can be targeted anytime and 
anywhere.21 It is not clear whether in the situation where a nominated CiC is de jure 
viewed as member as member of the armed forces and thus combatant, then  de facto 
CiC executive/s should be also be afforded the same status.  
 
If, on the contrary, the CiC holder is deemed civilian not incorporated into the armed 
forces under domestic law, then their involvement in the decisions related to the 
prosecution of armed conflict will have to be scrutinized under the requirement of 
‘direct participation in hostilities’.22 In this context, exercising effective or actual 
operational command over armed forces seems to fully satisfy the definition of the 
concept provided in the commentary to the Article 43 commentary whereby such 
participation involves ‘acts of war, which by their nature or purpose are likely to 
cause actual harm to the enemy armed forces’.23 Depending on the activity at stake, it 
seems plausible that such operational command can, in theory, satisfy more detailed 
elements of the concept of direct participation in hostilities (DPH) espoused in the 
ICRC Guidance including the threshold of harm and belligerent nexus. Admittedly, 
there may a problem with satisfying the ‘direct causation’ requirement, which the 
ICRC Guidance interprets very literally and by and large links it with the actual 
involvement in the combat.24 It further states that a distinction has to be made 
between acts merely facilitating the ‘creation of capacity to cause harm’ in general 
and this means indirect participation such certain logistical support or working in the 
a munitions factory will not result in a loss of civilian protection.25 One could say that 
some CiC decisions may be considered to fall into such defined indirect participation, 
such as the deployment of armed forces into a theatre of operations and some other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 DINSTEIN, SUPRA N 14,  34  
22 DOD MANUAL ¶ 5.7.4 
23  Y. SANDOZ, C.SWINIARSKI & B. ZIMMERMANN(EDS), COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 19777 TO THE GENEVAN CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, par. 1679 (ICRC 1987) 
24 THE GUIDANCE 48-55 
25 THE GUIDANCE 53. This finding has been criticized by W. Boothby indicating that some acts can 
be viewed as indirect participation but in practice the same acts can lead directly to harmful acts for 
example training or equipping members of armed forces may constitute an integral part of the harmful 
act. WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 157-58(1st ed. Oxford University Press 
2012). 
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decisions may be closer to more direct causation such as issuing direct order to attack 
leadership of the enemy armed forces.26 What is clear is that CiC functions are quite 
unlikely to involve literate combat engagement on the battlefield. Two consequences 
follow from there. First, there could be CiC holders that cannot be regarded as prima 
facie lawful targets and only as protected civilian because their domestic law does not 
recognize them as members of the armed forces and that their de facto scope of 
authority under CiC competencies cannot, in substantive terms, satisfy the ‘direct 
causation’ element of DPH. 27 Secondly, where the scope of the CiC is not limited 
only to functions broadly related to the war effort and capacity-creation, then  a 
determination of the CiC under DPH has to be undertaken on a case-by case analysis, 
which will also have a temporal limitation of such a CIC being targetable only ‘for 
such time’ as they engage in the acts constituting DPH. Consequently, a narrow 
interpretation of the ‘direct causation’ and the scope of the acts falling within DPH 
notion, as proposed in the ICRC Guidance, may lead to a conclusion that some 
holders of CiC functions may not be lawfully targetable based solely on the strength 
of these functions. Contrary to numerous assertions in LOAC sources, one should not 
assume that individuals vested with the CiC functions can be uniformly regarded as 
lawful targets either based on their status or on their conduct constituting DPH.   
 
A separate question arises in the context of the collective exercise of CiC authority. If 
one was to assume for a moment that the CiC was considered as a member of armed 
forces, would this mean that all members of the Cabinet, vested with CiC authority, 
would be too considered combatants in the contexts of international armed conflicts 
and as members of the armed forces, targetable also in non-international armed 
conflicts? Or would it suffice that they are members of the Cabinet, an organ as a 
whole and thus in the position suggesting a collective sharing of the same powers? In 
United Kingdom, for example, the Cabinet is a collective decision-making body 
comprising the Prime Minister and over twenty cabinet Ministers. Cabinet Ministers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Similarly DOD MANUAL¶ 5.7.4. 
27 One way of addressing the ‘membership in armed forces’ problem might be through an adaption of a 
‘functional membership’ approach applied by US in the context of organized armed groups.(DOD 
MANUAL¶ 5.7.3.2) Accordingly, in situations where CiC position is incorporated into operational 
military chain of command but not regarded as a formal member of armed forces then CiC authority 
holder could be considered to a functional member based on the CiC functions relating to conduct of 
hostilities.  
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are mostly heads of departments, known as Secretaries of States, each with a specific 
portfolio. All Secretaries of State jointly hold the same office and unlike the Cabinet, 
as a whole are, are vested with legal powers.	   All members are bound to support 
Cabinet decisions even if they were not present.28 This concerns decisions about 
belligerent reprisals, which do link directly to the conduct of hostilities.29   
 
In the situation where the domestic law does not recognize or does not stipulate at all 
whether the CiC is a member of armed forces, then each member of the Cabinet will 
be subject to scrutiny for DPH. The question remains whether a member of the 
Cabinet who is not present at the Cabinet meeting that is involved in acts that may be 
interpreted to satisfy DPH such as the vetting of a high-value but high-risk enemy 
target, could still be regarded as DPH. Clearly these members who are present at the 
meeting and involved in the act in question can be regarded as military objectives but 
only for such time as they are involved in this act. The non-present members of the 
Cabinet should not be seen as lawful targets as whilst they may be members of a 
collective body, they cannot be considered to DPH at that time. In practical terms, this 
means also that once the Cabinet moves to discussion of other matters of the day the 
present Ministers are no longer considered DPH and thus regain their civilian 
protection.  
	  
2.2. Ministers of Defence / Defense Secretaries 
 
The Ministry of Defence is the Government department and highest level of military 
headquarters controlled by a Minister of Defence or equivalent. Minister of Defence 
acts as both a political and administrative organ, dealing with administrative, financial 
and personnel affairs of armed forces and normally directs defence planning and 
operational strategy. As part of these competencies Minister of Defence may issue 
direct orders to armed forces, including possibly orders regarding the conduct of 
hostilities. Typically the head of a Ministry of Defense will be a civil, political figure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  OONAGH GAY&THOMAS POWELL, THE COLLECTIVE REPONSIBILITY OF THE 
MINISTERS- AN OUTLINE OF ISSUES, Briefing Paper 04/02, 11-12 (House of Commons Library 
2004) 
29  UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, Joint Service Publication 383,  (2004) ¶16.19.2 [hereinafter UK 
MANUAL] 
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but invariably the post can also be held by a military professional. Dawoud Rajha, 
Syrian Defense Minister, killed in July 2012 during the early stages of the Syrian 
internal armed conflict, was a former chief of staff of the Syrian Arab Army and the 
land forces of the Syrian military prior to the appointment in 2011.30  
 
Following a logic of analysis of the legal position of the CiC, it is reasonable to 
observe that unless Ministers with a Defence portfolio can be considered as members 
of the armed forces and a part of the operational military chain of command with 
authority to make specific decisions that are directly affecting combat operations, then 
the lawfulness of targeting them will be limited to ad hoc, limited in time occasion 
when they find themselves involved in acts that satisfy the conditions of DPH as 
described in the ICRC Guidance. The US may arrive to a different conclusion given 
its take on the notion of DPH. Accordingly, as clearly contributing to operational 
combat, the US Secretary of State of Defense would be targetable. Such a 
determination will become inherently much more difficult in a state that do not define 
clearly the position of Ministers of Defense in the military chain of command. 
Ascertaining the position of other cabinet Ministers may too be complicated 
especially in the context of non-international armed conflicts. 
	  
2.3. Members of the Government 
 
Other Ministers in the Government, such as the Ministers of Interior, the Ministers of 
Justice or those responsible for Intelligence would normally be presumed to be 
civilians, unless under the domestic law they would be integrated into armed forces.31 
During a conflict in Darfur, the police was fighting alongside the armed forces and 
thus the Darfur Commission questioned civilian status of the police.32 They may loose 
this protection when and for such time as they directly participate in the hostilities. 
Whilst this holds true in armed conflicts both of international and non-international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 OLGA KHAZAN& BENJAMIN GOTTLIEB, Who were Dawoud Rajha and Asef Shawkat?, The 
WASHINGTON POST, 18 July 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/who-
were-dawoud-rajha-and-asef-
shawkat/2012/07/18/gJQAkGVVtW_blog.html?utm_term=.73d4026e1904 
31 See also a discussion above related to the collective exercize of  the CiC functions. 
32 REPORT OF THEINTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR TO THE 
SECTERTARY GENERAL, S/2005/60, 1 FEB. 2005, ¶422 
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character, during internal conflict the organized groups not always perceive such 
Ministers as civilians and respect their civilian immunity. Throughout the conflict 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) claimed that under the Colombian 
Constitution both police and armed forces are defined as Security Forces under the 
control of Ministry of Defence.33 Similarly, both the National Democratic Front in 
Philippines and the Kosovo Liberation Army viewed the state’s police units as 
constituting security forces and thus possibly lawful targets.34 However, this is not a 
view, which can be supported in the context of legal analysis. Unless police forces or 
intelligence agencies are integrated into the armed forces of the state they remain 
civilians. Individual members of the police or intelligence agencies can be targetable 
if and for such time they DPH. The same applies to other ministers, such a Minister of 
Interior or Minister of Intelligence. 
 
The Government may create collective organs dedicated to specific matters. One such 
departmental committee in the UK is the Defence Council.35 The Defence Council 
was established in 1964	  under the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Act 1964 and was 
vested with functions of previously existing bodies including the Admiralty, the War 
Office, the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Aviation.36 It comprises both political 
executives and military professionals under the lead of the Secretary of State for 
Defence.37 Under Royal prerogative powers and through ‘Letters Patent’, the Queen 
and the Parliament via Acts of Parliament empowered the Council to command over 
the armed forces. Defence Council powers are delegated further down to three service 
boards though it is clear that decisions to commit the armed forces to operations, 
allocation of resources and setting out strategic limits on using force rest with the 
Cabinet.38  Determination of the status of the members of such Council must be 
always be undertaken on an individual basis. Military members of the Council will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
357, 368 (1st ed. Oxford University Press 2012). 
34 Ibidem , also in DOD MANUAL¶ 5.7.4. 
35 Noteworthy, Defence Council is not the same as National Security Council, which Cabinet’s level 
collective committee a forum for discussion of matters of national security. The latter is largely 
concerned with defence strategy, intelligence coordination and other matters related to national 
security. 
36 The London Gazette, No. 43277. 20 March 1964. 2545. 
37  Ministry of Defence, HOW DEFENCE WORKS, 1 Dec. 2015, ¶ 22, 29-30 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/484941/20151208HowD
efenceWorksV4_2.pdf  
38 Ibidem, ¶ 72 
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satisfy the requirement of combatancy in international armed conflicts and equally be 
military objectives in non-international armed conflicts in both situations based on 
their membership in the armed forces. Political members of such Council will remain 
civilians who can be only targeted if the acts they are involved in acts that meet the 
criteria for DPH, particularly the previously mentioned element of  ‘direct causation’ 
and only for such time as they DPH. In practice some of their acts, specifically related 
to the conduct of operations, are more likely to fit this criterion due to the very nature 
of the vested powers. Having said that one must not forget all the potential caveats 
arising in relation to an interpretation of a scope of DPH and the exercising of powers 
by collective Governmental bodies.    
	  
2.4. Political Party leaders 
 
Last consideration in the context of state leadership must be made in relation to 
political party leaders. So far the discussion of the various competencies related to the 
exercise of executive authority shown that there may be instances in which civilians 
in charge of command over the armed forces or oversight of the conduct of hostilities 
might be deemed lawful targets depending on the state’s constitutional setup, clarity 
of domestic legislation and/or individual circumstances. This is very much different 
from exercising political party functions and ascertaining one’s legal status based on 
these functions. In general the members of political parties must be classed as 
civilians, though some of these members may indeed be linked to potential military 
wings of these parties. In relation to the latter, there may some situations in which it 
would be possible to regard such an individual’s acts in the context to the relationship 
to organized armed groups constituting military wings of the political parties as acts 
of direct participation in hostilities.  
 
In single political party systems ascertaining such a relationship may be immensely 
difficult. During the military operations against Iraq in 1990-91 and 2003, for 
instance, an issue of the status of members of the Iraqi Ba’ath party became pertinent.  
Greenwood argued that the combination of the highly military nature of the Iraqi 
government, and the close integration of the Ba’ath party in government structures, 
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meant it was justifiable to see them as military objectives.39 While they may be lawful 
targets it would not necessarily be based on their combatant status applicable to the 
whole party as whole but rather on an individual conduct-based assessment in light of 
the DPH criteria. Reportedly, captured Ba’ath party members were not seen as 
combatants and were not granted POW status.40  
 
More recently, during the 2008-09 Israeli offensive in Gaza, the association of the 
Palestinian governing authorities with the Hamas party was raised in the context of 
targeting. It was argued that the Palestinian Ministry of Interior, for example, oversaw 
the Hamas-controlled governmental forces in Gaza.41 Others have contested this 
position.42 In practice untangling such relationships, especially in internal armed 
conflicts, is likely to be very difficult. What is clear is that designating all members of 
political parties as military objectives based on their general affiliation to political 
party is wrong. Membership in political party does not equate to a membership of in 
organized armed groups but these two may sometimes overlap. Determination of the 
individual members’ combat-related activity ought to be undertaken on a case-by–
case basis, whether it involves membership in an organized armed group, for those 
who do subscribe to this concept: continuous combat function and/or DPH activity in 
sensu stricto.  
 
Given this level of uncertainty around the factual circumstances of the relationship 
and possibly legal qualification of persons in this area, a caution is advised in the 
future analysis. It may be that a presumption of civilian status from Article 50 (1) of 
Additional Protocol I should be applied more frequently in cases involving individual 
members of political parties, especially in armed conflicts where delineation of the 
political and militant party activities may be difficult.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 C. Greenwood ‘Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in the Gulf 
Conflict’ in P. Rowe, ed., The Gulf War 1990-1991 in International and English Law, Routledge, 
London 1993, at 63 
40 GIULIO BARTOLINI, Air Operations against Iraq (1991 and 2003) IN NATALINO RONZITTI & 
GABRIELA VENTURINI (Eds), CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW OF AIR WARFARE 241 (Eleven International Publishing 2005)  
41 Laurie R. Blank, The Application of IHL in the Goldstone Report: Critical Commentary, 12 
YEARBOOK OF INETRNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 359 (2009). This position, however, 
has been challenged for an absence of supporting evidence.  
42 Z. Yihdego, Gaza Mission: Implications for International Humanitarian Law and UN Fact-Finding, 
13 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2012) 
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3. Targeting infrastructure associated with leadership  
 
Determination of the lawfulness of objects associated with state and political party 
leadership is governed by a different legal standard than one applied to persons. The 
relevant standard applied in the context of objects involves the application of a 
definition of military objectives, which will be introduced next. 
 
3.1. Requirements of the Definition of Military Objectives 
 
The definition of military objectives is found in Article 52.2 of Additional Protocol I. 
It consists of two main elements namely: 1.) an effective contribution to military 
action; and 2.) an offer of definite military advantage.43 The first element relates to the 
characteristics of the object, which describe its contribution to military action. Such 
contribution can be achieved through four criteria: nature, location, use and purpose. 
Three out of four of the criteria, namely location, use and purpose, are contextual, 
which means their satisfaction will depend on the circumstances. The fourth criterion, 
nature, refers to an inherent characteristic of the object, which will always be the 
same. 44  Effective contribution to military action denotes the object’s role in 
connection to military action. 
 
The first element of the definition is connected to the second, definite military 
advantage offered by destruction, capture or neutralization of the object. This 
connection occurs in a way, which not only appears to require both elements at the 
same time, but also, and more importantly, guarantees that the first element will 
always have to be fulfilled.45 This is an important feature of this relationship, with far-
reaching practical consequences. Whilst there are objects, which can easily satisfy the 
second element of the definition without satisfying the first, one would struggle to 
find an object that satisfies the first element but fails to fulfill the second.46 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For extensive discussion of the definition of military objectives see JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1. 
44 JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1, Chapter 3, sect 3.1 
45 Ibidem, Chapter 5, section 5.1. 
46 JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1, 145 
	  	   17	  
The first criterion from the four specified in the first element of the definition is 
nature.  The nature criterion concerns an intrinsic character of the object, which 
makes effective contribution to military action. What is it about the object that makes 
its contribution uniquely military in character? To satisfy this requirement, the object 
needs to possess exclusively military features or qualities, which distinguish it from 
other objects. Such qualities – which relate to its intended application, its functions 
must be connected to the conduct of military operations.47	   
 
In reality target’s nature cannot change, as it is its inherent feature. However, in some 
circumstances legal effects flowing from the nature criterion may be suspended, 
especially when an object ceases to operate in the way that it is required by its nature 
and serves an exclusively civilian purpose.48 Consequently, the nature criterion can 
no longer be a determining factor for an assessment of the first element of the 
definition, and other criteria will have to be considered. 
 
The most relevant criterion to this consideration is use. Use criterion in the definition 
of military objectives denominates the current or present function of an object, 
whether inside or outside its normal or habitual use and practice which can be 
habitual and repeated or random and perhaps even accidental.49  Unlawful use or 
abuse of the object will also be relevant in this determination. In principle, however, 
the required use will occur outside or in addition to the normal civilian function of the 
object. The law does not specify its volume, intensity or particular kind, with the 
exception that by such use the target should effectively contribute to the military 
action.  
Military use is normally understood to mean that it has to serve military purposes for 
object to satisfy the first element of the test. It is often assumed that use of the object 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Some may be tempted to infer that if the object is identified as contributing by its nature then it does 
not have or need a specific nexus to hostilities. Every object needs to have a specific nexus to military 
operations to satisfy the first element of the definition. In the case of weapons or ammunition supplies, 
the nexus to hostilities is clear as it is their very nature through which such a nexus is established.  
JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1, 46-51 
48 A change in nature can occur only when the object is so fundamentally and radically transformed 
that it no longer retains the character by which it previously contributed to military action. In other 
words, the object would have to cease to exist in its current nature, and be resurrected as something 
else. 
49 JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1, 66-74 
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undertaken by a combatant would render this object a military objective. It is 
important to stress that even use by a combatant must make an effective contribution 
to military action.50 This may be the case when a computer infrastructure is used for 
purposes unrelated or indirectly related to a conduct of hostilities.51  
The second relevant criterion, albeit less prominent than use in this context, is 
purpose. Purpose criterion commonly refers to intended future use of the object 
although its other meaning, that of the reason of the object’s existence or creation, 
might be relevant in certain circumstances.52 In essence the requirement is that the 
attacker obtains an information suggesting that an object, which may or may not have 
been designed for military purpose, but currently not used as such, is rather likely to 
be used for military purposes in the near future.  Sometimes this may be inferred from 
the past practice, which must show a frequent and consistent pattern and not ad hoc or 
occasional activity. Unlike with the use criterion, such use will not have to occur for 
the object to satisfy the first element of the definition. Like the use criterion, however, 
the purpose requirement must entail a pertinent activity, albeit a prospect, which is 
related to conduct of hostilities.  
In the context of the assessment of the objects during the targeting process in armed 
conflict, it is vital to remember that such an assessment will be undertaken ex ante of 
the attack, in circumstances ruling at the time.53 This means it will be done based on 
the information available to the attacker prior to the attack, often during the planning 
stage, and not in hindsight. Whilst this information might be verified shortly before 
the actual engagement it cannot be expected to include information that came to light 
after the object got engaged.54 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 As noted in the recent Tallinn Manual on The International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare use of 
computers, for example, by armed forces for non-military activity may not necessarily be regarded as 
satisfying the definition. M.N. SCHMITT (Ed.), TALLINN MANUAL ON INERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE, 133 (Cambridge University Press 2013) . 
51 Even if the computers were used to access civilian email software, a transfer of ‘militarily useful 
information’ through such software would render such infrastructure legitimate targets .Ibidem. 
52 JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1, 75-80 
53 JACHEC-NEALE, supra n 1, 136-144 
54 See Art.57.2 (a)(i) Additional Protocol I requirement regarding eth verification of military objectives 
before the attack.  
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Having outlined the legal requirements let us explore whether infrastructure 
associated with state organs, individuals or political leaders, whose work is vital to the 
prosecution of armed conflict and who may exercise supreme command over armed 
forces, could be regarded as satisfying the requirements of the definition of military 
objectives. There is a caveat to be made before further analysis ensues. When 
considering objects associated with the direction of the conduct of armed conflict and 
control over armed forces in a post- attack analysis, it is not always clear if, and to 
what extent, buildings, facilities or other physical objects linked to the political 
leadership are in fact targeted for their own contribution. It may be that such buildings 
and places are damaged as a result of an attack on the people in them and therefore 
essentially subject to an assessment of the collateral damage.  
 
There are two fundamental ways in which infrastructure associated with the 
leadership can analyzed in the context of military objectives. First, some of these 
objects may satisfy the nature condition of the first element of the definition. This 
will exclusively be applied to Ministries of Defence (MoD) on account of their own 
military/ defence-related functions. Second, any other facilities related to leadership 
may comply with the use of the purpose criterion. Beyond these two situations, the 
question remains whether any such targets can be lawful targets based on general 
affiliation to persons whose position or functions relate to the conduct of hostilities. 
All three will be discussed in turn, starting with an evaluation of status of Ministries 
of Defence. 
 
3.2. Functions of the Buildings: Ministry of Defence   
 
Where the buildings themselves are targeted, this may be because of their sole 
functions on account of the activity undertaken in them or association with people 
whose functions are relevant to the conduct of war. One specific building that is often 
considered to satisfy the definition of military objectives on account of its functions 
such as the supreme command and control centre is an MoD. MoD, being a place 
where the most senior military leadership performs the highest defence functions, is 
viewed as an object satisfying the nature criterion in the definition on account of its 
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functions as an institution. 55 
 
If an MoD is viewed as a military objective because of its nature, would this also hold 
true if an MoD has departments dealing exclusively with civilian functions? One 
source gives the example of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil 
Protection and Sports, whose civil protection and sports sections are dedicated 
exclusively to civilian purposes.56 The setup of the Swiss Department is unusual in 
that it combines governmental departments dealing with strictly civilian issues with 
other ones dealing with military functions.  
 
MoDs normally act as both political and administrative organs, dealing with the 
administrative, financial and personnel affairs of the armed forces. They have the 
highest central defence command (General Staff), responsible for commanding 
troops.57 This means that, unlike facilities associated exclusively with the Defence 
sector of this Department, the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection 
and Sports, as a whole cannot be regarded as military in nature, though such 
infrastructure is likely to satisfy the use criterion (dual use).58   
 
If an MoD is generally regarded as of a military in nature, then a question arises 
regarding infrastructure associated with other state executive organs and other 
political figures, whose work is vital to the prosecution of armed conflict and who 
may exercise the supreme command over armed forces. The infrastructure of other 
governmental departments, whether central or local, which competencies are not 
linked to functions of military character, such as the Ministry of Interior or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 In 1956, the ICRC Draft Rules had already listed ‘War Ministries’ such as a Ministry of Navy, 
Army, Air Force, National Defence or Supplies, and other ‘organs for the direction and administration 
of military operations’ as possible military objectives. Par. 1 Sec.3 of the annex to Draft Rules for the 
Limitation of the Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War,. Also in The recently-
published Air and Missile Warfare Manual asserted in Rule 22(a) that Ministries of Defence were 
objects which would effectively contribute to military action by their nature, at all times and in all 
circumstances. Rule 22(a) Rule 22 (a), MANUAL On INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE ,Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard 
University, 15 May 2009.    [hereinafter: AMW MANUAL] 
56 AMW Manual, supra n 6, Commentary to Rule 22 (a), par.2. 
57 Article 58 (b) Additional Protocol I may be a relevant consideration that Swiss government may take 
into account in the future. 
58 Objects performing both military and civilian functions could not be considered legitimate targets 
due to their nature, instead such objects will be judged according to their use or purpose. 
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Intelligence agencies, cannot be regarded as military objectives under the nature 
criterion.59 During an armed conflict, they may be used for military purposes, even 
exclusively so, but their nature is not what will guide a legal analysis of their status.	  
This will be explored next.	  	  	  	  
3.3.  Use/Purpose: Objects used or intended to be used by CiCs, Defence 
Secretaries, other members of the Government or members of political 
parties 
 
Most commonly, when infrastructure is targeted because of an association with 
human activity it is because it used in a manner that effectively contributes to military 
action. This includes, for example, a house used as an ammunition store. Similarly a 
hotel providing accommodation for combatants is seen as being used or likely to be 
used in the future for purposes closely related to military action and thus considered a 
lawful target. As such, it is the object’s qualities that enable the activity, which serves 
military purposes and consequently contributes to the military action. While the 
object’s contribution is linked to what people do and/or are likely to do in the future, 
if the purpose criterion is concerned, its basis is the capacity or ability to facilitate the 
human activity. Importantly, the nature of the human activity in itself must have a 
belligerent nexus.  
 
It is worth noting that, in principle, it does not matter who undertakes the activity so 
long the activity itself serves the military purposes. After all, it is irrelevant who 
brings and leaves the ammunition at the house; it is the fact that the ammunition is 
being stored at the house is what makes the house a military objective. In the hotel’s 
example, it is the facilities’ function to provide a place to stay for a member of the 
armed forces  that is viewed as serving military purposes. Consequently a hotel can be 
targeted even if the combatant is not present at the premises at that time, given that 
her or his belongings are at the premises or the booking has been made – all also 
constituting indicators also of the purpose criterion. Similarly, if the hotel is used or is 
intended to be used in the future by a directly participating in hostilities civilian who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 A. P. V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 123 (3d ed. Manchester University Press 2012). a 
contrario to DINSTEIN, supra n 14, 97.  
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is a member of an organized armed group and possibly, to those who subscribe to the 
notion, also understood to hold a continuous combat function, then the hotel can be 
viewed as satisfying the use or purpose criteria. The object could be seen as satisfying 
the first element of the definition because it facilities or enables combat activity of the 
said individual and in this way it contributes effectively to military action at the 
circumstances given at the time. The decision whether to attack such an object would 
depend on all the remaining elements of the definition, and other provisions 
regulating how the attack should be undertaken as along as the membership and/ or 
the combat function continues. 
  
On the other hand, in a situation where the hotel is used by directly participating in 
hostilities civilian sensu stricto, one would have to ensure that the activity that the 
person is engaging in a relation to the object is indeed serving military purposes and 
only for so long as that the person is engaged in the said activity. Merely staying at 
the hotel by does not necessarily implies an undertaking of an action harmful to the 
enemy. However, staying at a hotel en route to a planned operation or for a meeting 
facilitating a planning of harmful action would mean that the object is contributing to 
the military operation and thus satisfying the use criterion. In this situation an object 
has to be used in such way at the time of attack. This does not necessarily mean a 
person has to be present physically at the premises though by and large the nature of 
the harmful activity serving military purposes will involve or even necessitate 
physical presence. One can imagine a different situation where a facility or any of its 
elements is being used remotely to undertake harmful acts for example in the context 
of a data centre being used for a cyber operation.  
 
The purpose condition can also be fulfilled depending on the nature of information 
available to the attacker at the time of attack. However, an attacker would have to 
ensure, as a part of the verification of the military objective prior to the actual attack, 
that a person continues to be engaged in the harmful activity which constitutes a 
factual basis for meeting the purpose criterion in the definition of military objectives.  
 
How does this apply in the context of targeting infrastructure associated with the state 
and political party leadership? Can a hotel where the Commander-in-Chief stays be 
regarded as equally contributing to military action? The answer to this may depend on 
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whether, and to what extent, the individual’s functions related to military action are 
undertaken during his stay in the hotel. Such object’s contribution would be linked to 
who the people are and what their functions are.  
 
There is no doubt that if the persons vested with CiC functions are deemed to hold 
combatant status due to their integration into the armed forces, then objects used or 
intended to be used by them are likely to satisfy the use and purpose criteria.  If they 
are not combatants, but who are involved in taking decisions related to the 
prosecution of hostilities or otherwise exercise command over armed forces, then the 
use or purpose of the object would be determined in relation to the nature of the 
activity they engage in. Prime Minster, who during a stay in countryside a retreat,  
connects remotely with the Cabinet in order to issue an authorization to attack a target 
clearly engages in activity which constitutes as direct participation in hostilities. At 
the same time, he or she uses an Internet network established at the retreat facility to 
connect  with other members of the Government in order to make this decision or ever 
to oversee the actual attack undertaken at the same time on the battlefield. Clearly at 
that point the building itself becomes targetable in these circumstances. Furthermore, 
a golf course facility, which is frequently used by a President to undertake activity 
related to the prosecution of hostilities, provided that activity is directly linked to the 
combat operations whether as a part of military operational command or not, can also 
be regarded to satisfy purpose criterion if the information available in the 
circumstances given at the time also suggests that there is an intention to use such a 
place for that activity in the specified future. This will be clearly be applicable to any 
individual, be it a Prime Minister, a member of the Cabinet, a Secretary of State for 
Defense or a member of a political party, who uses or intends to use an object in the 
furtherance of an activity that constitutes an underlying basis for their direct 
participation in hostilities. At the point when they desist from this activity, the object 
cannot be considered to continue to be used or is intended to be used to facilitate such 
activity.  
 
Taking a step further, can the Minister of Defence’s private residence be considered 
as satisfying the requirements of the definition? The answer will be in the affirmative 
only in respect to the specific nature of the actual activity undertaken or intended to 
be undertaken in such a residence. Can a political party headquarters qualify in this 
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respect too? Yes, so long and for so long as individual members of the party, or in fact 
anyone else undertaking activity in use of such a building, engages in an act harmful  
or likely to be harmful to the adversary and that this use of the building specifically 
enables, assists or facilitates a continuation or accomplishment of the act in question.  
 
The question further arises as to whether assets of any state organs or political entities 
can be targeted based on their more general association with said organs and entities? 
This question will be explored in the subsequent section.  
	  
3.4. General affiliation of the objects  
 
Buildings or places which appear generally linked to other political structures of the 
state, but which do not seem to be used in relation to exercise any functions related to 
the conduct of hostilities will unlikely satisfy event the first element of the definition 
of military objectives. This could be a political party’s facilities, or local government 
buildings or a private residence of the Prime Minister or Minister of Justice, who are 
clearly not using or intending to use such places to further actions harmful to the 
enemy and directly linked to the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict.  
 
Destroying the place where the members of the Government or political party 
normally meet, or work, does not meet the requirements of the definition. Unless 
there could be shown to be some other military nexus, either through the individuals’ 
directly related activities or separately based on the location criterion then such 
facilities, on account of their association with the state political system, cannot be 
deemed valid military objectives. It may be that a clear distinction might not be made 
between the state and party functions of political leadership in states in which the 
political system is closely incorporated into governmental structures.  This, however, 
would be of lesser importance, as the specific character of actions of the individual 




In targeting decisions related to the political leadership or infrastructure associated 
with the political leadership of the state it is first necessary to establish who or what is 
	  	   25	  
the intended target of an attack. Establishing whether the attack is directed at the 
people using the buildings, or at the buildings themselves is vital as the ensuing legal 
analysis of the status of the target will be different in the context of the people and the 
objects.60  The assessment of objects associated with the political leadership does 
depend on an assessment of the circumstances which determine their contribution to 
military action, as well as the advantage resulting from their destruction, capture or 
neutralisation as required by second part of the definition of military objectives.  
 
It is conceivable that the destruction, capture or neutralisation of facilities that 
facilities the work of the political organs who take decisions regarding the prosecution 
of military operations would offer a definite military advantage. Ministry of Defence 
is considered a lawful target on account of the command and control functions of the 
Ministry as an institution. It is viewed as an object satisfying the nature criterion in 
the definition as due to its intrinsic military character. MoD effectively contributes to 
military action because its functions are intrinsically linked to the conduct of military 
activities. There is no doubt that an attack on a Ministry of Defence would offer 
definite military advantage. The same cannot be said in the case of a building 
occupied by the Commander-in-Chief who, has delegated his supreme command 
authority to other state organs or who does not use the facility to engage in activity 
constituting a basis for their direct participation in hostilities. The destruction of the 
buildings where a de jure and de facto Commander-in–Chief, recognised as a 
combatant whose decisions are directly related to the conduct of hostilities, is likely to 
bring substantial military benefits whilst satisfying the first element of the definition. 
There may be other civilians in the state political structure who exercise other 
functions which may directly impact on the conduct of military operations. In so far 
and so long as they use or intend to use the objects in furtherance of these functions, 
such objects can be considered lawful targets on account of their contribution to 
military action and offer of definite military advantage. It is clear that such buildings 
cannot be legitimately characterized as satisfying nature condition except for  a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 This is not altogether clear, as states tend not to share publicly any detailed explanations when they 
engage such targets. For example, in 2003, Coalition forces started their operations in Iraq with an 
attack aimed at Saddam Hussein, who was believed to have been visiting the al-Dora farm on the 
outskirts of Baghdad. This clearly indicated that the object of the attack was a human one. It is entirely 
possible that the facilities in the farm might have separately been of military significance.  
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Ministry of Defence but because of their specific use, they may satisfy the use or 
purpose requirements of the definition, in addition to the location criterion. The basis 
of the their contribution to military action will inevitably be linked to the character of 
the activity of the person.  Therefore two key factors inevitably need to be taken into 
account when considering the status of such targets, namely the character and scope 
of the individual’s activity that gives raise to an object’s contribution to military 
action and whether there is any time limitation that may affect the existence and 
duration of such activity. Specifically, the application of the test will depend very 
much on the assessment of the activity of those exercising of the official functions 
contributing to the prosecution of military operations and that general affiliation of 
the objects to a political structure does not suffice. 
As the use or intended future use of an object depends on the factual circumstances 
which are often fluid and subject to rapid change, so the status of the specific target 
can also be potentially variable. One must recognise that in respect of Ministries of 
Defence, due to the characteristics of the nature condition, such change will enable 
the application of the other contextual criteria found in the first part of the definition 
of military objectives.   
 
 
 
 
